El Inglés om den taktiske situation.

Vi lever – endnu – i en “Phoney War” – men fronterne er ved at aftegne sig overalt i Europa – opmarchen er i gang.

I sit essay “The Death of Democracy” analyserede den britiske filosof El Inglés hvorledes demokratiet i sig bærer kimen til sit eget fald. Som vi nævnte kunne dette essay forekomme noget pessimistisk, men at El Inglés ingenlunde er pessimist vil fremgår af hans nyeste bidrag til afklaringen af situationen her i førkrigstiden. Her foretager han en slags mønstring af tropperne – “Trooping the Colours“.  Modstanden mod den igangværende islamisering er voksende overalt i Europa, navnlig i de lande, hvor samfundsordenen som følge deraf er mest eroderet og hvor kaos, kriminalitet og polarisering er endnu mere fremskreden end i Danmark. Disse lande er alle karakteriseret af regeringer som med stedse mere desperate midler søger at påtvinge deres befolkninger politisk korrekte opfattelser, hvilket selvfølgelig blot fører til yderligere polarisering. Hvilket viser sig ved fremkomsten af mere eller mindre organiserede tiltag i retning af politisk ukorrekte partier og borgerbevægelser – for ikke at tale om selvtægtsgrupper og egentlige borgervæbninger.

Nærmest udbruddet af borgerlige uroligheder er lande som England, Holland, Frankrig og Belgien, hvor muslimerne og deres suicidale medløbere fører sig tydeligst frem og føler sig kry i ly af regeringernes og pressens åbenlyse støtte. En mulig undtagelse herfra er Sverige, hvor censuren af meningsdannelsen og fraværet af demokrati gør forholdene svære at vurdere. Med udgangspunkt i England vurderer El Inglés her den taktiske situation forud for konflikten. Hans analyse kan – i mine øjne – tvangfrit overføres til danske forhold. Fra Gates of Vienna:

Reflections on the Civil War in Britain

by El Inglés

Given the obvious and apparently unalterable trajectory that Britain is charting towards violent conflict between the historic British people and our Muslim fifth column, it might be interesting to indulge in a little harmless futurology with respect to the likely characteristics of this conflict. The idle speculation that makes up the content of this essay is hereby offered up by a playful mind with, perhaps, too little to gainfully occupy it.

If the historic British people (hereafter referred to as HBP) and the Muslim fifth column (hereafter referred to as MFC) contaminating their country ever do descend into a Troubles-style conflict writ large across the whole of the United Kingdom, it is certain that the conflict will be highly asymmetric in nature. I do not imply by this that it will be a particularly close parallel of any classic asymmetric conflict, such as those in Vietnam, Afghanistan, or Malaya. Rather, I imply simply that the characteristics, strengths, weaknesses, and geographical dispositions of the two sides are so different as to preclude the possibility of them bringing to bear on each other the same types of violence with the same objectives. This point will become clearer as we proceed through the essay.

In the interests of imposing order on a subject matter that lends itself to disorderly rambling, I will organize this essay thematically. Each section will pick a specific theme and consider, as seems appropriate, the relative advantages and disadvantages of HBP and MFC in each regard.

Size

The UK currently has a Muslim population of approximately 2.4 million. Let us assume, conservatively, that 5% of this population is supportive of terrorist attacks against the British state and people by believers residing within it. This equates to 120,000 people who might be prepared to support, more or less directly, an attack of this sort.

In comparison, the UK has a total population of 61 million people, of whom approximately 90%, or 54.9 million, can be considered white British. If a mere 1% of these people were to be supportive of terrorist attacks of some sort on the Muslim population of the UK, then we would already have some 549,000 white Britons in this category. A brief ‘exchange’ of terrorist actions between these two subsets of their relative populations would undoubtedly polarize the political situation, increasing the size of both terrorism-supporting groups, to an extent not amenable to being solved by any purely political means at all. As and when such natives minorities emerge and start to occupy themselves with their political agendas, we will be in a hard game indeed.

MI5, the British domestic security service, has repeatedly claimed to be stretched to the limit by the very real threat of Muslim terrorism. One is reluctant to believe everything people in such services say in public statements, but it does seem to be the case that the reason Mohammed Siddique Khan, ringleader of the 7/7 London bombers, was not put under continued surveillance was that there were simply not sufficient resources to do so, despite existing concerns about him. Given the massive growth in the Muslim terrorist threat in the UK in the last few years, and given further that any branch of government will be afforded resources roughly commensurate to the tasks it must undertake, it seems likely that MI5 will indeed have been struggling to make its budget cover the rapidly emerging Islamic threat.

Of course, budgets can be increased. But organizations cannot be usefully or speedily expanded simply by throwing money at them. An organization like MI5 must grow organically, screening and training new staff and incorporating them into its operational structure. Accordingly, the rate at which it can grow will be limited quite irrespective of the financial limitations imposed upon it.

Now imagine a state of affairs in which 549,000 people, amongst a population a hundred times as large, support in some fashion the use of violence by non-state actors against the UK Muslim population or some part thereof, and some smaller subset become involved in actively planning and attempting to carry out such attacks. Such a development would instantly dwarf the ability of MI5 and Special Branch to keep track of even a small fraction of the terrorist violence being plotted throughout the entire country, and this would be true as long as the conflict raged, as there is no conceivable way that these services could increase their capacity by a factor of, say, 50, to keep up with an entirely plausible (indeed, laughably conservative) 50-fold rise in the amount of tribal violence between MFC and HBP.

Geographic Distribution

This is, apart from size, arguably the single greatest asymmetry in the looming conflict. MFC is overwhelmingly concentrated in urban areas, most obviously London, the West Midlands, and the North of England. HBP on the other hand, have, unsurprisingly, a strong presence throughout the entire country, and are the only occupants of rural Britain to all intents and purposes. This situation has many and varied implications. I will discuss them mainly from the Muslim point of view, HBP’s advantages and disadvantages being implicit in the reverse position.
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1.		The urban concentration of Muslims gives them a high chance of being able to obtain some sort of local dominance in key areas. How long this dominance lasts is another question, but it is probable that certain areas will hemorrhage non-Muslims fairly rapidly.
2.		The urban concentration of Muslims and the consequent urban nature of the battlefield (no Muslims, no battle) gives Muslim an advantage of sorts in that their ‘forces’ are all close at hand and their lines of communication short. In any serious breakdown of civil order, however, during which it becomes dangerous to be identified as the enemy outside one’s own territory, this will effectively trap Muslims in small urban enclaves from which they cannot easily escape, with all accompanying psychological and logistical pressures.
3.		At least in its early stages, the conflict will still be at least somewhat amenable to being constrained by regular law enforcement activities. Urban areas are so saturated with CCTV cameras and will have such a short police response time that great risks will be taken by those who engage in paramilitary activity in these areas at first, be they Muslim or British.
4.		The urban concentration of Muslims and the drastically reduced general mobility they will suffer when things start to get ‘hot’ will be a huge disadvantage. Curfews; house-to-house sweeps looking for weapons, explosives, and wanted individuals; aerial surveillance; all of these things will be much easier for the apparatus of state to perform on Muslims than on their opponents, who will be a) naturally dominant in more rural areas and b) able to move around there with little suspicion. Only very rarely does one encounter a cultural enricher whilst strolling England’s leafy pathways, and their sudden presence there will not go unresponded to in the event of unpleasantness between them and the British, by state or non-state actors.
5.		Muslim enclaves cannot be considered self-sufficient in any way, shape, or form. Food, water, medical supplies, and power must all be provided, albeit in different ways, from outside. Any or all of these supply routes can, in principle, be cut. Rubbish collection can be disrupted; mobile phone masts can be shut down or signals jammed; phone lines can be cut. All Muslim areas will be subject to these pressures should conflict break out; British areas will not be subject to them at all except insofar as they are adjacent to Muslims areas. Furthermore, the technical expertise required to build and maintain infrastructure of this sort lies overwhelmingly in the hands of the British.
6.		A significant majority of the land mass of the United Kingdom has virtually no Muslims in it at all. This will provide the British with a huge area of operations in which to train, drill, experiment with firearms and explosives, and also with plentiful opportunities to meet and plan in areas where both technical and physical surveillance on the part of the police/security services are hard to conduct.
7.		Muslim enclaves are likely to expand, or at least consolidate, as ethno-religious cleansing forces both Muslims and British to retreat from certain areas in favour of others. This will simplify the situation for all actors and entrench the psychological divide.

People in Positions of Power

MFC has, thankfully, relatively low concentrations of people in professions which would provide privileged access of the sort that would be useful to would-be terrorists. Policemen, politicians, military personnel, civil servants, and the like: any such figure in a position to aid and abet any sort of terrorist organization would be worth his weight in gold to it.

Such figures are, of course, to be found overwhelmingly among HBP, and will likely prove to be recruitment targets for any underground organization which finds itself to be sufficiently underwhelmed by MFC to decide to try and attack it in some fashion. Even something as straightforward as an illicit flow of reliable intelligence as to the whereabouts and/or routines or potential targets in the Muslim community would massively increase the effectiveness of such organizations, for whom intelligence-gathering will be difficult due to the tribal nature of the conflict and the difficulties of infiltrating enemy groups.

The degree of intellectual and ideological corruption that swathes of our apparatus of state now labour under notwithstanding, there must still be high concentrations of people in the military, the police, and the civil service who are appalled at what the cancer of Islam is doing to their country, and who will eventually end up being well-disposed to those who would strike back against Islam on British soil. This will become all the truer if Muslims target the police or military on British soil, which they have already tried to do and will almost certainly try to do again in the event of serious conflict. The collusion of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the British Army in at least some loyalist paramilitary attacks on republican targets during the Troubles is well known (though the scope of such collusion is still controversial).

Dispositions/Sympathies of Police, Military, and Ex-Military

Following on from the previous section, the British police are, for reasons I will not pretend to understand, perpetually trying to increase the representation of ethnic minorities within the force. Thankfully, these efforts seem to be doomed to failure, with all minorities remaining underrepresented. This is a huge blessing for those of us concerned about the shape of things to come. Irrespective of the degree of corruption the police manifest as an institution due to the political pressures already being placed on them, they will remain overwhelmingly white, and of working class and lower middle-class background. Their sympathies can therefore be expected to remain with HBP, and the degree of contempt and disgust the British bobby feels for MFC can only be expected to increase.

As with the police, so with the military. Muslims are massively underrepresented in the British military, with this too being a situation that the idiots at the Ministry of Defence are trying to ‘remedy’, with a similar degree of success. Trying to predict in any detail the likely deployments or attitudes of the military in the event of a serious breakdown of civil order between MFC and HBP is beyond the scope of this essay. Suffice it to say for the moment that it is highly unlikely that the rank and file of the military, having spent the last several years fighting Muslims across the world, will feel much sympathy for MFC. Nor can they be expected to be well-disposed to the idea of shooting their fellow white Britons to enhance the security of Muslims. Whether or not the officer class would be likely to pass along orders from their civilian superiors to engage in such shooting is a question I will have to leave to others to answer. Personally, I consider it unlikely. Forcing one’s troops to disobey one’s orders by ordering them to shoot their own people in their own country is an activity that no right-minded officer is likely to engage in.

Lastly, there is the question of the likely activities of ex-military personnel during conflict between HBP and MFC. At the risk of stating the obvious, it seems improbable that such folk would sit around watching the growing disorder on the television when they could be ‘contributing’ to it themselves. No longer constrained by chain of command, quite possibly full of hostility towards Muslims, certainly missing the smell of cordite in their new 9-to-5 office jobs where ‘combat’ consists of firing elastic bands at people, and with old military networks and know-how still in place, ex-military personnel are likely to flood into any organizations promising a chance to stick it to the believers on the shores of Albion itself. And there will be tens of thousands of them, many of them, one would imagine, in the police. If those in government tasked with considering these matters (as opposed to those tasked with singing the glories of our newfound diversity) are not having sleepless nights over this, then they are not doing their jobs properly.

In contrast, Muslims have virtually no one in the UK with any conventional military experience. The Muslim way of war consisting largely of car bombings and throat-cuttings, and we must expect these to be the most commonly-used tactics during what is to come. However, in contrast with the strict rules of engagement that apply in Iraq and Afghanistan, tribal conflict on home soil will be a largely gloves-off affair. HBP responses to such Muslim attacks are likely to be conducted with a robust disregard for the Geneva Convention, to which MFC is not a signatory anyway.

International Networks/Support

During the Troubles in Northern Ireland, the Ulster Volunteer Force (one of the two main loyalist paramilitary groups) suffered severe weapons procurement difficulties, largely as a consequence of the lack of ideological allies outside of Northern Ireland. Their attempts to procure the equipment they needed to advance their war against the IRA often foundered on the mercenary nature of international arms dealers, who would take their money then fail, in whatever fashion, to deliver the weaponry. In contrast, the IRA enjoyed two sources of genuine support in this regard during the Troubles. One nationalist, one ideological, they were the Irish-American population and the Libyan regime of Colonel Gaddafi respectively.

In contrast with the difficult position of the UVF, there is a huge, gradually unfolding wave of hostility and alarm with respect to Islam not only across the whole of Europe, but also across the United States, and, perhaps to a lesser extent, Canada and Australia. Israel and India are two other countries which appear to have their own ‘issues’ with Islam, and surely contain factions who would not be averse to seeing a blow struck against it in the UK or any other European country. What this means is that intelligence, propaganda, funding, personnel exchanges and the procurement of war materiel on the part of anti-Muslim non-state actors will increasingly come to be distributed across a vast swathe of the world with massive trade and transport links, substantial cultural, historical, and racial ties, and large concentrations of educated and wealthy people.

Even in Europe alone, there is already a thicket of countries with vocal anti-Islamic parties and organizations, and the stirrings and rumblings of less orthodox resistance to the ongoing process of Islamization. The almost perfect overlap of concerns, dangers, and likely responses will make the formation of international networks amongst these parties inevitable. A situation may be reached in which the difficulty facing anti-Muslim paramilitaries is not how to procure weapons, but exactly what to choose and whom to accept it from.

Muslims are in a slightly different position in this regard. There are extant Muslim criminal networks in place throughout Europe, be they looser or tighter, which are already cooperating to some extent in their various criminal activities. These gangs will already have smuggling operations in place for shipping, for example, stolen cars out of Europe and weapons and drugs in. It is highly probable that they will be very heavily involved in logistical, financial, and operational aspects of the Muslim side of any widespread tribal violence that ensues in Europe. Indeed, they may well end up taking a central role, in contrast to the probable central role of ex-military, rogue military, and rogue police elements on the British side.

Ease of Identification

Proselytisation efforts notwithstanding, the Muslim population in the UK still consists overwhelmingly of peoples who are ethnically foreign. Well aware of the degree of scrutiny this brings down upon them, they seem of late to have started trying to recruit people from other ethnicities. Germaine Lindsay, one of the four 7/7 bombers, was of Jamaican origin; Richard Reid, the now-infamous shoebomber, the son of an English mother and a Jamaican father; and Nicky Reilly, the failed Exeter bomber, white British. This development notwithstanding, certain regularities of appearance, name and country of origin will continue to make Muslims stand out from Europeans, particularly the most ideologically and politically important ones.

In contrast, Britons determined to oppose the Islamization of their country by fair means or foul will not be physically identifiable as belonging to any group worthy of concern. Muslims in the UK can be profiled to a greater or lesser extent, but ‘profiling’ the British population of Britain will not be possible.

Cultural Barriers to Violence

There is only one clear disadvantage that Europeans will possess with respect to law enforcement, and it is one of the likely consequences of what one might call the unimaginability of violent or vigilante action for many of those Europeans. It is, in some sense, the reverse of the culturally sealed nature of the Muslim community, as outlined above.

It is, of course, a great thing to live in a country in which the rule of law obtains, and in which the authorities do, on the whole, a good job of maintaining law and order, helping people to live in peace and prosperity. But one of the consequences of this is that any sort of vigilante action becomes borderline inconceivable for the overwhelming majority of the population. ‘They’, the authorities, the government, the people upstairs, will always take care of any problem, even when it is clear that ‘they’ created the problem in the name of their social engineering goals, that ‘they’ are not about to admit their own culpability, and that ‘they’ are willing to identify their own people as the source of all difficulties and act accordingly if that is what it takes to try and control the situation.

Even those not convinced of the omnipotence and benevolence of the state will, on the whole, have lived lives in which major criminality and violence have played no part. It will not be a simple matter for such people, many with homes, careers, families, and other things to lose, to step over the line into vigilantism or paramilitary activity. Even providing financial, logistical, PR, or intelligence-gathering support may be a bridge too far for many who are otherwise concerned about Islam. Of course, this resistance to involvement will weaken as the conflict escalates, often in response to specific events or incidents (as happened with support for the IRA after Bloody Sunday). The point to be made here is that, at least at the onset of major hostilities, a far greater fraction of Muslims can be expected to pass the psychological threshold to participating in these activities due to the following factors:

1.		Their brute tribalism, and tribal hostility and contempt for the British people
2.		Their contempt for British law, evinced by their crime rates and incarceration rates
3.		The savagery and degeneracy of their cultures (for first-generation immigrants) and parent cultures (for second and later-generation immigrants)
4.		Their personal and historic (i.e. cultural) lack of acquaintance with the rule of law, a strong and fairhanded state, and civic identity
5.		Their (accurate) awareness of themselves as minorities and their acute vulnerability should conflict break out

There is a second advantage for MFC in this regard. The high barriers to vigilante violence among HBP will not only reduce the fraction of them prepared to engage in such violence, it is also likely to increase their unease at the idea of others amongst them engaging in it, and therefore the probability of them informing on those of their fellow Britons who do. This is a subtle point, and one upon which there will be legitimate disagreement. Let us consider the issue from the Muslim perspective.

The general hostility that many Muslims in the UK feel to their host country is well known to even the most casual observer of these matters. Though this hostility has many unfortunate effects, the one that is most obviously relevant to the discussion here is the larger margin for error that it will grant to Muslims interested in planning and carrying out some sort of terrorist on British soil.

One of the critical moments for any type of would-be terrorist organization is surely that moment at which it approaches a potential recruit and asks him (it probably will be a him) whether he is interested in joining. How exactly the offer is phrased is undoubtedly a matter of personal taste, but the key point here is that there must be some point at which a line is crossed, and at which it is conveyed to the potential recruit that the recruiter is a member of a terrorist organization.

There is no one way of guessing what the likelihood of such an offer being accepted is. But if it is not accepted, what happens then? Of course, the side making the offer is likely to simply let the matter drop there, perhaps pretending that it was only made in jest or that the party they attempted to recruit misunderstood their intentions. But the side receiving the offer is now faced with a choice of sorts: to inform the authorities or keep their new knowledge about the affiliations of their acquaintance to themselves. What then, is the probability of them deciding on the former? Again, there is no way of providing a definitive answer to this question, but it seems reasonable to suppose that many Muslims will refrain from informing on other Muslims involved in terrorist activities, especially given that opinion polls conducted in the UK have suggested that it is so. If this speculation is correct, it constitutes a big handicap for the security services trying to infiltrate such groups, all other things being equal. Muslims guerillas may well be able to swim in the sea of MFC more easily than their British counterparts can swim amongst HBP. Whether this will actually prove to be the case is an empirical question that cannot yet be answered with confidence.

Degree of Pre-Infiltration

I suggested above that the ability of the security forces to keep a lid on rapidly escalating MFC-HBP violence would be extremely limited. Of course, one could argue that this would work to the advantage of Muslims just as much as to the advantage of Europeans, but there is an important reason why this is not so. I am no authority on the ins and outs of intelligence work vis-à-vis Muslim communities in Europe, but one thing is passably clear from the very small number of successful attacks and very large number of disrupted terrorist plots: Muslim communities in Europe must be riddled with security service assets and/or severely compromised with respect to investigation in other regards. There is simply no other way that so many plots could be disrupted. Not all Muslim would-be terrorists are stupid enough to try and buy ten gallons of hydrogen peroxide from a hairdresser.

Clearly, this degree of infiltration is not something that can be obtained overnight, or without a substantial investment of time, money, manpower, and political capital. To rephrase, the security services must have already sunk a great deal of their available operational capital in infiltrating MFC, and this investment is one of extremely low liquidity. They cannot cash in an asset in Hizb ut-Tahrir’s UK branch and use the proceeds to buy an equivalent asset in the (presumably) fictional Albion Liberation Front. If they wish to similarly infiltrate the loosely-knit web of European anti-Muslim paramilitary groups that will, I predict, emerge in the years to come, they would have to start almost entirely from scratch except insofar as such groups are part of the conventional extreme right, which is undoubtedly already infiltrated to some extent. What this means is that the MFC would be likely to both constitute and remain a much more heavily infiltrated and therefore compromised community than its enemy, HBP, in the event of the outbreak of mutually inflicted tribal violence.

Availability and Types of Targets

It is to be observed that virtually all paramilitary organizations have operational constraints imposed upon them by the amount and type of violence that their supporting populations are prepared to tolerate. Even an organization as ruthless and unconcerned with civilian casualties as Al-Qaeda eventually ran into trouble for the massive civilian casualties it inflicted in Iraq, on Sunnis, Shias, men, women, and children. Other, more restrained organizations (such as the IRA) took trouble, at least some of the time, to choose non-civilian targets, to give warnings shortly before bombs were to detonate to facilitate evacuation of the relevant areas, and so on.

In the event of serious hostilities between HBP and MFC in the UK, British paramilitaries will have to consider their targets carefully so as not to lose political and other types of support. It would be futile to try and examine this matter in detail, as the political state of play in such a scenario cannot be predicted. However, there is one observation that can already be made with confidence, and that is that Britain is already a target-rich environment for those who would target Muslim actors without bringing an unacceptable degree of opprobrium down on their hands, even in the initial stages of conflict before polarization was complete.

Let me be more explicit, and provisionally divide potential Muslim targets up into three categories, in order of decreasing whackability (my apologies for the technical language).

Category 1 – A significant fraction of the British population would be happy to see these people get whacked, and those who really objected would be few and far between

• Muslim gang members and drug dealers
• Released Muslim criminals, especially rapists, murderers, and the like
• Pakistani pimping gangs and accomplices in the North of England
• Openly seditious Muslims/members of seditious Muslim organizations
• Members of British-located outlets/subsidiaries of problematic organizations with headquarters abroad, such as Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood
• Foreign jihadists in the UK, allowed to remain for whatever reason

Category 2 – A reasonably large fraction of the British population would be happy to see these people get whacked, but there would also be substantial objection from another large fraction

• Members of Islamic ‘civil rights’ organizations
• Muslim public figures who cause HBP paramilitaries ‘concern’
• Muslims at ‘radical’ mosques, i.e. mosques whose attendees have an unfortunate tendency to espouse jihad and sharia

Category 3 – A hardcore minority of the British population would be happy to see these people get whacked, but the majority, including many broadly on the anti-Islam side, would have serious reservations or express complete outrage

• Muslim petty criminals
• Muslim illegal immigrants

Beneath Category 3 we would have unobjectionable and blameless Muslim civilians, violence against whom would overwhelmingly be condemned by the British people at least in the early stages of conflict. Of course, if the conflict became unpleasant enough, violence against random Muslims might be supported. But that is another matter.

The significance of the above lies in the fact that British anti-Muslim paramilitaries could liberally hack away at certain parts of the MFC without particular concern over the possibility of a damaging PR backlash. Category 1 Muslims will earn little sympathy irrespective of what happens to them, and Category 2 Muslims perhaps not a great deal more. Whacking Category 3 Muslims or below could start to cause problems, but staying away from them will keep violence within a zone that will not start to dangerously compromise support for the paramilitary group in question. Those who are unclear on this point should research, for example, the difference between the Warrenpoint bombings (when the IRA succeeded in killing 18 members of the British Army) and the Enniskillen bombings (when they succeeded in killing one off-duty policeman and ten civilians, massively to their own detriment).

HBP paramilitaries will therefore have myriad opportunities to polarize relations between HBP and MFC in the UK and take the situation beyond the point of no return, without incurring the opprobrium directed at those who kill innocent civilians. Furthermore, there are so many targets that they could continue to focus on them even if MFC started to engage in random sectarian killings in response. The response of the British state to such killings on the part of MFC would probably be more than sufficient to deal with such a development.

If MFC wishes to retaliate, it will have to do so via random killings and bombings as mentioned in the previous paragraph because it has no equivalent targets. The only targets they will have that will not bring the hostility of the entire British people and establishment down on their heads will be each other. If I were a Muslim trying to construct my own list of targets equivalent to the above, who would I put on it? The Conservative Party? UKIP? The BNP? The Centre for Social Cohesion and Douglas Murray? The police? The EDL? Prominent critics of Islam? Salman Rushdie? Campaigners against Islam, like SIOE and its leader, Steven Gash? Lord Pearson and Baroness Cox, who invited one Geert Wilders to the House of Lords? Any attack, successful or otherwise, on any of these targets (including the BNP), would repel and outrage the entire country. MFC will have no ‘elbow room’ in this regard.

Objectives and Plausibility of Objectives

The last great advantage that HBP will have over MFC in the event of major hostilities between them is that HBP will have open to them formal and informal objectives both legitimate and plausible, whereas this will be much less true for MFC. Let us consider this important point in detail.

MFC is a very recent graft, a graft that has been inflicted on HBP without their consent, and through the perfidy and treason of their political class. Its roots in the UK are shallow, and its disproportionately criminal, parasitic, seditious, terrorist, and ideologically hostile and subversive nature make those roots much shallower in effect than those of, say, the Hindus, whose history in the UK is of essentially the same length. Very few British people would walk down a street full of Pakistanis, or Somalis, or Algerians and feel in any meaningful way that the people around them were now ‘just a part’ of the British people. No good thing that exists in the UK, not one, exists because Muslims in the UK created it.

In contrast, and at the risk of stating the extremely obvious, the British people have been in Britain rather a long time. Moreover, every good thing that exists in Britain exists because, and only because, they created it. As a consequence there is no meaningful claim that Muslims can make to Britain, anything in it or a single square inch of its territory. Contrast this with, for example, the centuries-long presence of the Protestant British settlers in Northern Ireland. Whatever one’s take on Irish history, it can hardly be argued that they are some blip within it, and even the IRA never argued against the presence of these Protestants in what they would call the Six Counties. Rather, they argued against the political authority of the British state in Ireland, and for the creation of a united Ireland with substantial regional autonomy enjoyed by its component parts.

Now, it is my contention that the British can argue in favour of a relatively Muslim-free Britain, and against the presence of any substantial numbers of believing Muslims in their country at all. Even failing that, they can argue against further Muslim immigration, for the deportation of Muslims without British citizenship, for the deportation of criminal Muslims, for the deportation of sharia and jihad-supporters, for the withdrawal of benefits from Muslims, and so on. Many would think these political objectives are hopelessly implausible, but I feel we are not that far away from seeing them enter the political mainstream in more and more European countries, as they have already started to do in the Netherlands. Either way, they are real, concrete objectives that are all physically plausible and will all eventually be demanded.

MFC has no such equivalent goals. They cannot demand the deportation of Britons, reduced immigration of Britons, fewer Britons sucking tax revenues out of them, or the like, because these demands are all meaningless. They cannot even demand partition and independence, as it could not possibly be granted. They would not be economically viable, their Muslim territory would simply be besieged, savaged, and destroyed by the non-state actors already in the conflict, and any members of the government trying to grant independence would be swinging from lamp-posts by the end of the day. Besides, what would we give them? The North of England? No, partition is clearly inconceivable. The only meaningful demands Muslims could make would be for more of the same: more immigration, more money, more appeasement and more sharia. But of course, it will have been precisely these things that will have precipitated violent conflict in the first place, so such conflict would only be further inflamed by granting more.

Of course, Muslims being Muslims, there will be the usual maniacs who think they can beat the whole of Britain in a civil war and somehow benefit from it. But in reality, the increasingly precarious status of Muslims in Europe, already clearly visible at a psychological level, will only increase massively when real conflict breaks out. Muslims will then have no good options left to them. They may demand protection, but there is not much more they can ask for. What this means is that there is no obvious way the British government can ‘break’ in favour of MFC, but many ways it can do so in favour of HBP. Concessions are likely to be granted in one direction only when things start to disintegrate.