Waffen-Villy og La Grande Armée de Eurabia.

Folkesocialisterne har vedtaget at Danmark skal deltage i EU’s militære eventyr.

Det første spørgsmål der rejser sig er naturligvis: Hvem skal vi slås mod? - Tjaeh, hidtil har den glorværdige EU-hær klogeligt holdt sig uden for enhver farezone. Så snart det begynder at blive lidt farligt i Sudan og i Tchad aflyser man missionen. Fra EU-Referendum:

• Despite the concerns of nascent EU power, we now learn that the deployment has been delayed, the reason being that there has been “heavy fighting” between government troops and Sudanese-backed rebels, who have been marching towards the capital in a bid to topple president Idriss Déby. — [...] — So, the EU has an “army” that cannot fight and will not be deployed anywhere dangerous in case it suffers casualties. On that basis, one could be forgiven for thinking that there is very little to be concerned about. The words “paper tiger” come to mind. We know the Europeans talk about “soft power”, but this is ridiculous. “Gone soft power”, might be more accurate.

Så det kan næppe være den slags operationer vor vakse Villy har i tankerne. Men EU vil jo være en supermagt som kan vise verden - specielt den store Satan, USA - hvor skabet skal stå. Uheldigvis har alle de gamle Europæiske stater skåret deres styrker ned til noget der ligger et godt stykke under det rent latterlige. Men der er jo en strålende fremtid forude, nemlig det forestående EUROMED-samarbejde, som etableres om små to år. Så kan vi fylde den indskrumpede Wehrmacht Neuropa op med kanonføde fra vore nye allierede i de arabiske lande. Supermagten Eurabia er dermed realitet og klar til at marchere gegen den ganzen Welt.

Men hvordan er det nu lige med de militære egenskaber hos araberne? - Inden Villy og hans folkestorm istemmer “Denn wir fahren” og “Heute gehört uns Dänemark, morgen die ganzen Welt” kunne det være en ide at repetere nogle basale facts om Hvorfor araberne taber alle deres krige :

Uddrag heraf, for eksempel:

• These attributes [of arab armies] included over-centralization, discouraging initiative, lack of flexibility, manipulation of information, and the discouragement of leadership at the junior officer level.

• An Arab technician knows that he is invaluable so long as he is the only one in a unit to have that knowledge; once he dispenses it to others he no longer is the only font of knowledge and his power dissipates. This explains the commonplace hoarding of manuals, books, training pamphlets, and other training or logistics literature.

• Thinking outside the box is not encouraged; doing so in public can damage a career. Instructors are not challenged and neither, in the end, are students.

• Most Arab officers treat enlisted soldiers like sub-humans.

• In general, the militaries of the Fertile Crescent enforce discipline by fear; in countries where a tribal system still is in force, such as Saudi Arabia, the innate egalitarianism of the society mitigates against fear as the prime motivator, so a general lack of discipline pervades.

• The show-and-tell aspects of training are frequently missing because officers refuse to get their hands dirty and prefer to ignore the more practical aspects of their subject matter, believing this below their social station. A dramatic example of this occurred during the Gulf war when a severe windstorm blew down the tents of Iraqi officer prisoners of war. For three days they stayed in the wind and rain rather than be observed by enlisted prisoners in a nearby camp working with their hands.

• The military price for this is very high. Without the cohesion supplied by NCOs, units tend to disintegrate in the stress of combat. This is primarily a function of the fact that the enlisted soldiers simply do not trust their officers.
• Decisions are made and delivered from on high, with very little lateral communication. This leads to a highly centralized system, with authority hardly ever delegated. Rarely does an officer make a critical decision on his own; instead, he prefers the safe course of being identified as industrious, intelligent, loyal—and compliant. Bringing attention to oneself as an innovator or someone prone to make unilateral decisions is a recipe for trouble. As in civilian life, conformism is the overwhelming societal norm; the nail that stands up gets hammered down. Orders and information flow from top to bottom; they are not to be reinterpreted, amended, or modified in any way.

• Officers with initiative and a predilection for unilateral action pose a threat to the regime. This can be seen not just at the level of national strategy but in every aspect of military operations and training.

• I have observed many in-country U.S. survey teams: invariably, hosts make the case for acquiring the most modern of military hardware and do everything to avoid issues of maintenance, logistics, and training. They obfuscate and mislead to such an extent that U.S. teams, no matter how earnest their sense of mission, find it nearly impossible to help. More generally, Arab reluctance to be candid about training deficiencies makes it extremely difficult for foreign advisors properly to support instruction or assess training needs.

• The well-known lack of trust among Arabs for anyone outside their own family adversely affects offensive operations.

• he same lack of trust operates at the interstate level, where Arab armies exhibit very little trust of each other, and with good reason.

• In terms of safety measures, there is a general laxness, a seeming carelessness and indifference to training accidents, many of which could have been prevented by minimal efforts. To the (perhaps overly) safety-conscious Americans, Arab societies appear indifferent to casualties and show a seemingly lackadaisical approach to training safety. There are a number of explanations for this. Some would point to the inherent fatalism within Islam.

• Arab officers do not see any value in sharing information among themselves, let alone with their men. In this they follow the example of their political leaders, who not only withhold information from their own allies, but routinely deceive them.

Og endelig: Until Arab politics begin to change at fundamental levels, Arab armies, whatever the courage or proficiency of individual officers and men, are unlikely to acquire the range of qualities which modern fighting forces require for success on the battlefield. For these qualities depend on inculcating respect, trust, and openness among the members of the armed forces at all levels, and this is the marching music of modern warfare that Arab armies, no matter how much they emulate the corresponding steps, do not want to hear.

Så mon ikke vor folkesocialistiske ven ,”Waffen-Villy” , skulle til at tænke sig om en ekstra gang….Inshallah?